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Abstract 
Women’s recruitment to ministerial office is improving, but our understanding of 
what determines women’s access to cabinet remains underdeveloped. Comparative 
studies explain women’s ministerial presence through correlations with country-level 
socio-economic or political factors. This research uses a feminist institutionalist 
approach to explain gendered access to cabinets. It uses original data from 
interviews with former ministers and special advisors to map the rules in use of 
ministerial recruitment. It demonstrates that that women’s access to ministerial 
office is facilitated and constrained by three complexes of predominantly informal 
rules which structure: who is eligible to be chosen (the eligibility pool); how to 
qualify (specialist or generalist principles); and who selects ministers (the prime 
minister or the party). By examining the rules of ministerial recruitment in two 
Westminster democracies, Australia and the UK, the research demonstrates the 
differences that exist, even in most similar cases, at system level, at party levels, 
and over time. By identifying the specific complexes of rules which shape women’s 
access it is possible to identify the rule changes which have been effective in 
improving women’s ministerial opportunities and suggest future reform strategies 
which would be most effective in the specific context.  
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Rules of Ministerial Recruitment 
Introduction  
Ministerial office represents the pinnacle of political power. Quite rightly, politics and 
gender and comparative scholarship is paying increasing attention to women’s 
access to political executives (Davis 1997; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000; Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Whitford et al 2007; Krook and O’Brien 2012; 
Claveria 2014). These studies develop and test a range of hypotheses relating to 
the demographic, socio-economic, political cultural or political institutional factors at 
state or system level deemed to shape women’s access to political executive office. 
The conclusions primarily emphasize relatively general correlations between 
women’s ministerial representation and a nation’s familiarity with women in 
positions of power (Reynolds 1999), the prevalence of ‘egalitarian societies’ and 
‘leftist values’ (Siaroff 2000) or international pressure and regional contagion 
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). Studies which address the 
importance of political institutional factors affecting the supply and demand of 
female government ministers highlight the different procedures for appointing 
ministers in presidential versus parliamentary democracies (Reynolds 1999, 
Whitford et al 2007) or the generalist versus specialist recruitment traditions of 
ministerial recruitment in parliamentary democracies (Davis 1997, Siaroff 2000, 
Claveria 2014). All studies flag the significance of the numerical presence of women 
in parliament, and some the way the electoral system or gender quotas influence 
women’s access to parliament (Krook and O’Brien 2012, Claveria 2014).  
The premise of this article is that recruitment to executive office cannot be fully 
explained by the aggregate socio-demographic characteristics of ministers nor by 
the general characteristics associated with the political systems in which they 
operate. These studies’ general correlations do not explain the complex factors 
which structure pathways to ministerial office. To understand ministerial recruitment 
it is important to know precisely who is eligible to be chosen (the eligibility pool), 
how to qualify (generalist or specialist principles), and who select ministers (the 
prime minister or party).  
Regarding the eligibility pool, the existing literature finds that a high share of women 
in parliament correlates with high share of women in ministerial office, but this 
correlation only ever takes into account women in the single or lower house. This is 
misguided as there is a strong variation in rules across parliamentary systems 
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regarding whether ministers can be recruited from just the lower house (e.g. 
Germany), or from the upper house as well (e.g. UK, Australia). Moreover, it makes 
little sense to correlate women’s ministerial presence with the aggregate number of 
women in parliament as it is only women from the governing party or parties and not 
the lower house as a whole who are in the ministerial eligibility pool. Even when 
there is a high share of women in parliament, few may be eligible for ministerial 
office by dint of the fact that they sit on the opposition benches.   
Women’s presence in the eligibility pool does not automatically translate into a 
ministerial position. Yet the existing literature says little about the criteria that qualify 
someone to move from the recruitment pool to ministerial office. The one exception 
is Davis (1997) who specifies that specialist systems recruit on grounds of policy 
expertise while generalist systems reward political skill, service and loyalty. She 
finds that specialist systems are more open to women’s recruitment than generalist 
systems (1997, 46) but this is measured quantitatively rather than qualitatively.  
The existing literature also provides incomplete explanations for the demand side of 
ministerial recruitment: who is it that selects ministers? Some studies test for 
correlations between the presence of a female Prime Minister (PM) and the number 
of female ministers (Krook and O’Brien 2012) and other between governments of 
the left and women’s ministerial presence (Siaroff 2000). But this literature does not 
capture or explain the central role the PM, as primary selector, plays in structuring 
demand for female ministers, particularly where she is not required to form a 
coalition. Nor does the literature capture the significance of other actors, such as 
political parties, who play a role in ministerial selection.  
The claim of this article is that ministerial recruitment is best explained by using new 
institutionalist approaches to reveal complexes of formal and informal rules which 
govern who is eligible, how to qualify, and who selects ministers. Drawing on the 
theoretical contributions of feminist institutionalists (Kenny 2007, Krook and Mackay 
2011, Chappell and Waylen 2013), the article makes the case that women’s access 
to ministerial office is best explained by the way these complexes of rules distribute 
power unequally between men and women. It also shows how rule change in these 
three complexes have and could improve women’s chances of securing ministerial 
office. The research adopts a most similar system research design, selecting two 
countries with seemingly similar rules at the system level - the UK and Australia 
(Rhodes et al 2009). In these two Westminster democracies: ministers may only be 
  4 of 24 
recruited from within parliament; in both systems generalist criteria determine who 
qualifies as a minister in both systems; and in both countries the PM has, in theory, 
autonomy over ministerial appointments as the need to share portfolios with a 
coalition partner is rare. This research design allows us to establish the extent to 
which rules determining ministerial recruitment are identical at the system level and 
identify the differences that exist between and within similar systems, as well as 
over time. The article first sets out the benefits of a feminist institutionalist approach 
to the study of executive recruitment and the methodological implications of 
researching formal and informal rules; second it presents empirical data on the 
complexes of rules which govern who is eligible to be chosen, how to qualify and 
who selects ministers in the UK and Australia, as well as how these rules are 
gendered and have changed; third, it concludes with an evaluation of the types of 
rules which govern ministerial recruitment, stressing the predominance of informal 
rules, and some proposals for institutional reforms which would improve women’s 
access to ministerial office in the future.  
 
Rules, Power and Gender 
New institutionalist (NI) analysis recognizes that political life is structured by formal 
rules, informal practices and ideational norms (March and Olsen 1984; North 1990; 
Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999; Thelen 2003), and institutionalist scholars 
specify that each political arena has its own distinct set of formal and informal rules 
of the political game (Chappell and Waylen 2013, 608, Annesley and Gains 2010, 
Mackay and Rhodes 2013). Feminist institutionalism (FI) significantly adds to NI 
analysis by theorizing and researching the ways in which formal and informal rules 
are gendered (Kenny 2007; Krook and Mackay 2011; Chappell and Waylen 2013). 
Institutions can, for example, experience ‘gender capture’ due to men’s domination 
of politics or a ‘gender bias’ that ‘seep[s] into supposedly impartial or gender neutral 
arrangements’ (Goetz 2007, 46-7).  
Formal rules are ‘formally constructed and written down’ (Lowndes and Roberts 
2013, 53) in a constitution, terms of reference, code of conduct, regulations or 
policies. These can easily be identified and studied through the ‘tools of the lawyers 
and the historian’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 54) and by the formal sanctions on 
actors who do not adhere to formal rules. Formal rules can be explicitly gendered in 
negative or positive ways (Lowndes 2014, 687). Equally, in politics ‘seemingly 
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neutral rules […] may have gendered effects because of the way they interact with 
informal rules derived from wider gender norms’ in private or public life (Lowndes 
2014, 687) or with rules in other parts of the political system.  
Political life is structured not only by formal rules, but also by informal rules, the 
‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, 727; 
see also Azari and Smith 2012). Informal rules are ‘specific to a particular political 
or governmental setting, they are recognized by actors (if not always adhered to), 
[and] they have a collective (rather than personal) effect’ (Lowndes and Roberts 
2013, 47). For FI scholars, informal rules relating to gender are key to 
understanding how power is allocated in the political world (Chappell and Waylen 
2013). This includes social norms concerning men and women’s respective roles 
and accepted ideas about feminine and masculine modes of behavior ascribed to 
men and women in public and private life, what Chappell (2002, 11) refers to as the 
gendered ‘logic of appropriateness’. 
Formal and informal institutions work together in a variety of ways. Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004, 728-9) propose that informal institutions can be: complementary, 
filling the gaps by ‘addressing the contingencies not dealt with in the formal rules’; 
accommodating, creating incentives to ‘behave in ways that alter the substantive 
effects of the formal rules’; competing, structuring incentives ‘in ways that are 
incompatible with formal rules’; and substitutive, achieving what formal institutions 
were meant to, but failed to achieve. An alternative strategy for establishing and 
assessing the interaction of formal and informal rules is through the concept of 
‘rules in use’ (Ostrom 1999; Lowndes 2014; Kenny 2013), which avoids ‘making any 
strict separation of informal and formal rules or prejudging their relative significance’ 
(Lowndes 2014). This strategy identifies rules as ‘the way we do things around 
here’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 41) or the ‘dos and don’ts that one learns on the 
ground’ (Ostrom 1999, 38). For FI scholars gender norms and practices shape the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions (Chappell and Waylen 2013). 
Institutions are not neutral in their disposition but distribute power in ways that 
create opportunities for and constraints on different actors (Burch and Holliday 
1996). FI scholars make the case that power flows to one sex rather than the other 
as a consequence of the gendered balance of power when the institution was 
established (Kenny 2006, Krook and Mackay 2012). According to Chappell & 
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Waylen (2013, 607) ‘earlier rules about gender can survive in an informal guise and 
continue to operate to enforce the same (old) expectations, relationships and power 
structures’. 
Formal and informal rules change, and the way they interact is dynamic (Azari and 
Smith 2012). Rules, practices and norms may combine to produce institutional 
stability over time, but change can occur when gaps or contradictions open up 
between formal institutions, creating instability (Lowndes and Roberts 2013; Azari 
and Smith 2012). When the ‘fit’ between different parts of an institutional 
configuration weakens, ‘creative spaces’ open up which can lead to institutional 
change (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 134). Political actors enact and sustain 
institutions but actors can also exploit ‘creative spaces’ to make, bend and break 
rules (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 105). Creative spaces can also be purposefully 
created by activists who ‘can work to instate practices and rules that recast the 
gendered nature of the political’ (Beckwith 2005, 132-3). However, a change in 
formal rules may not be accompanied by a change in informal rules, including 
gender norms, which are notoriously ‘sticky’ (Chappell and Waylen 2013, 603).  
To identify the gendered and dynamic rules in use in the recruitment of ministers in 
the UK and Australia the research employs a qualitative methodology. To identify 
any formal rules which shape ministerial recruitment it refers to the constitution, 
laws, regulations or policies at the national and party levels. Informal institutions, 
though hard to spot, identify and measure, can ‘be recognized by actors and can be 
described and explained’ either directly to researchers, or in the form of insider 
accounts and expert observations (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 47). To identify the 
informal rules of ministerial recruitment this research uses data derived from seven 
semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the author with UK and Australian 
ministers, former ministers and special advisers 2007-13, supplemented by 
published sources such as autobiographies, insider accounts, and media reports. In 
addition to this qualitative data by a numerical overview of women’s presence in 
Australian and UK cabinets and parliaments since the early 1980s is provided in 
tables one and two.  
 
Who is Eligible to be Chosen?  
In Westminster parliamentary democracies such as Australia and the UK the rule is 
that eligibility for ministerial positions is restricted to members of the national 
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parliament. The Australian constitution states that ‘no Minister of State shall hold 
office for a longer period than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a 
member of the House of Representatives’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Ch 2 
Para 64) while in the UK it is a ‘convention […] that ministers must be members of 
either the House of Commons or House of Lords’ (Parry and Maer 2012, 1). Both 
parliamentary systems are bicameral and in each case ministers can be recruited 
from the upper house as well as the lower house. This rule determines that the 
eligibility pool of ministers is broader than just the lower chamber.  
However, there are consistently fewer women than men in the ministerial eligibility 
pool. Table one shows the number and share of women on the government 
benches in the lower and upper houses at the point at which the government was 
formed. Women’s share of government seats in the lower house ranges from 2.3 
per cent (1979) to 27.6 per cent (2005) in the UK and from 8 per cent (1983) to 32.5 
per cent (2007) in Australia. Systematic data on the members of the House of Lords 
by gender and party in the House of Lords over time is not available, but snapshots 
from recent years show women’s share on government benches at between 20 and 
25 per cent (Eason 2010; Centre for Women and Democracy 2013). In Australia 
women’s share of seats in Senate ranges from 13.3 per cent (1993) to 43.8 per cent 
(2007).  
Table one about here 
Women’s access to the ministerial eligibility pool is determined by formal rules of 
the electoral systems or the procedure for nomination to the House of Lords. The 
electoral systems for the UK and Australian lower houses, though different, each 
involve a contest between individual candidates at the end of which just one is 
elected to a constituency. Such electoral systems do not deliver high percentages 
of female parliamentarians as there is steep, gendered competition at the party 
selection stage (Lovenduski and Norris 1989; Studlar and McAllister 1991, Kenny 
2013).  
Women’s presence in the upper house is stronger, particularly in the Australian 
senate, as a consequence of different rules of appointment. The proportional 
representation electoral system to the Australian Senate, in place since 1948 
(Curtin 2010, 401), means women have been permanently represented there since 
1943. In contrast, women’s access to the House of Lords has been constricted by 
two rules. Hereditary peerages were passed down the male line only until 1963 and 
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nominated life peerages were not granted to women until 1958 (Eason 2010, 72). 
Rule changes by Labour governments (1997-2010) to the Lords appointment 
procedure restricted the number of hereditary peers to 92 and opened up 
recruitment to the House of Lords as life peers though a process of nomination by 
party and selection by committee. This change significantly increased the presence 
of women in the Lords (Eason 2010). 
In the UK, peers and baronesses can and do become Ministers – indeed the 
cabinet position Leader of the House of Lords is reserved for one - but they are 
significantly outnumbered by ministers who are elected MPs (Parry and Maer 
2012). Table two shows that between 85 and 95 per cent of UK ministers are 
recruited from the House of Commons. Similarly, between two-thirds and three-
quarters of Australian ministers are recruited from the House of Representatives 
(see also Curtin 1997; Curtin 2010). Moreover, certain ministerial appointments – 
Prime Minister, Treasurer, and Minister for Foreign Affairs – are informally reserved 
for members of the House of Representatives (Curtin 2010; interview Australia 1). 
This informal rule has meant that Senators with certain ministerial aspirations ‘have 
had to relinquish their Senate position and seek election to the lower house’ (Curtin 
2010, p. 401). It is clear that although Australian and UK ministers can be recruited 
from both houses of parliament, competing informal rules favor ministerial 
appointments from the lower house.  
Table two about here 
Since membership of the House of Lords is now based primarily on selection, PMs 
can also proactively place favored ministerial candidates in the eligibility pool by 
appointing them to the upper house. In 2008 PM Gordon Brown made former MP 
Peter Mandelson a life peer so that he could return to cabinet as Business 
Secretary (Eason 2010) and in 2015 PM Cameron appointed Dr Ros Altman, former 
director of the pensioners’ lobby group Saga, as pensions minister (Read 2015). By 
extension, nomination to the Lords can be used as a strategy to boost women’s 
representation in government if the supply of eligible women in the Commons is 
low. In 2010 UK PM David Cameron selected five women to his cabinet, one of 
whom was Baroness Warsi, as an unpaid minister without portfolio (Annesley and 
Gains 2012). 
While an analysis of system-level rules is important, it is ultimately incomplete if it 
fails to acknowledge the important differences among parties within that system. 
  9 of 24 
Table one shows that the supply of potential female ministers is higher when the UK 
Labour Party or Australian Labor Party (ALP) is in government than at times when 
the Liberal-National Coalition or Conservative Party are forming the government. 
Formal and informal rules at the party level shape the supply of potential ministers 
in parliament. In the UK, the number of women in the lower house was boosted 
significantly by a formal party-level rule change by Labour regarding candidate 
selection in the run-up to the 1997 general election. The rule permitted All Women 
Shortlists (AWS) in candidate selection to ensure that women would be selected to 
run for constituencies in half of winnable seats (Childs 2002). Labour later 
introduced the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 which permits 
positive discrimination in the selection of all parliamentary candidates (Childs 2002). 
Of the main parties, only Labour has used AWSs and this accounts for the higher 
rates of female presence in the House of Commons: up from 60 female MPs in the 
1992 parliament (37 Labour women), to 120 following the 1997 election (101 
Labour women). The Conservatives opted for softer mechanisms ahead of the 2010 
election, namely the adoption of a priority list for candidate selection comprising at 
least 50 per cent women (Campbell et al 2006).  
In Australia, a formal rule change in the ALP constitution introduced affirmative 
action to promote women’s presence across the party structure, including in 
parliament. The initial 1981 ALP conference decision to support affirmative action 
set a target of 30 per cent women in the parliamentary party by 1990 (ALP 2004, 
20; Curtin and Sexton 2004, 12; Kent 2009). Despite being ‘on the books’ the 1981 
decision was weakly enforced because there were ‘no mandatory targets or 
sanctions’ (Kent 2009, 108) and there was no explicit requirement to select women 
to winnable seats (Curtin and Sexton 2004, 12). The formal rule was ineffective 
because ‘when push came to shove, many of the boys were unwilling to extend the 
power base for preselection’ (Kirner, cited in Kent 2009, 108). 
A second ALP affirmative action strategy was the adoption at the 1994 party 
conference of an explicit 35 per cent gender quota for all ALP party positions by 
2002, upped in 2002 to 40 per cent by the year 2012 (ALP 2004, 7; Curtin and 
Sexton 2004, 12). This rule, developed by ‘a national campaign in Labor branches, 
involving three generations of Labor women’ (Kent 2009, 108) was more strictly 
enforced by the National Conference through the threat of a sanction of all seats 
being opened up for reselection, running the risk of unseating incumbent men 
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(Curtin and Sexton 2004, 12). The impact of the quota was to double the number of 
ALP female candidates from 26 to 59 and to quadruple the number of women 
selected for winnable seats from 4 to 15 (Curtin and Sexton 2004) and indirectly the 
Liberal party has increased the number women contesting seats for parliament 
(Curtin and Sexton 2004, 12).  
 
How to Qualify as a Minister  
Being a member of parliament on the government benches is no automatic route to 
ministerial office. Members of the eligibility pool must secure ‘certification for 
eligibility for office’ (Davis 1997, 43). In generalist parliamentary systems, such as 
the UK and Australia, qualification for ministerial office derives from the ability to 
demonstrate ‘broad political backgrounds’ such as parliamentary expertise or 
service and loyalty to the party or leader (Davis 1997, 38). Such criteria are largely 
informal and hard to demonstrate that they have been met.  
Generalist political skills for ministerial office are accumulated and demonstrated in 
parliament and political parties. Some accounts of the informal rules of generalist 
ministerial appointment assert that ministers need to have served a certain period of 
time in politics. Davis (1997, 43), suggests at least seven years in parliament, while 
a former minister said she was appointed because she had ‘been around for almost 
10 years’ (interview Australia 2). Political skills can also be demonstrated through 
parliamentary positions, committee assignments (Davis 1997, 44, Kaufman 1997, 6) 
and good parliamentary performance (Berlinski et al 2009, 60). According to a 
former UK minister ‘it pays to be able to speak well in the House’ though ‘over-
exposure at Question Time is not recommended’ (Kaufman 1997, 5).  
Generalist political skills can also be accumulated via a political apprenticeship with 
a party which involves ‘hard work’ (interview UK 4) and extensive party 
campaigning and / or serving as a party official (interview Australia 1). Such party 
activities can fast-track newly elected MPs into ministerial office (interview UK 4) 
and internal party careers can count as prerequisites for certain ministerial posts. 
As well as the party leader being able to claim the post of PM, in Australia the 
portfolio of Treasurer is traditionally reserved for the deputy leader of a party 
(interview Australia 1; interview Australia 2). 
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Most significantly, loyalty to the PM and the party of government are important 
qualifying criteria in generalist systems of ministerial recruitment (Berlinski et al 
2009, 60). As Kaufman puts it ‘genuine loyalty […] is […] a rightly valued quality 
which is properly rewarded’ (1997, 3) and ‘being Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
the leader, whether in government or Opposition, is itself almost a guarantee of 
office’ (p. 6). Reflecting on why she was appointed to cabinet, one former minister 
cites her ethos of being ‘loyal and discrete’ (interview UK 4), another her loyalty to 
the PM in his leadership contest (interview Australia 1).  
Informal rules of qualification in generalist systems are strongly gendered. Davis 
(1997, 46) finds that ‘women […] have a more difficult time accessing the highest 
ranks of the elite in generalist systems than in systems closer to the specialist pole’ 
not because of women’s lower numbers in the eligibility pool but due to the informal 
‘rules of the political game’ (p. 54) which state that ‘access to the highest ranks of 
political power requires access to the lower rungs and participation in a way that 
certifies eligibility for the highest ranks’ (p. 55). The ability of female eligibles to 
qualify for ministerial office in generalist systems is constrained by the gendered 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (Chappell 2002), the enduring set of informal rules and 
norms attributed to male and female bodies and behaviors in political arenas. The 
informal rule determining ‘what makes a good minister’ is distinctively gendered with 
an expectation that ministers are male (Jenkins 2003).  
Women MPs’ capacity to accumulate generalist skills is curtailed by parties and 
parliament as gendered institutions (Lovenduski 2005, Puwar 2004). According to 
one female Conservative MP, parliament ‘was developed by men, for men […] that 
this is a real problem for us. It is not really designed to bring out the best in us’ 
(cited in APPG 2014, 36). Women’s historic absence from parliament means that 
men’s service will invariably exceed theirs, and women are more likely to be 
selected to represent marginal seats, meaning that they are less likely than their 
male counterparts to survive past one term. Opportunities for women to accumulate 
generalist skills to qualify as ministers are also curtailed by the mode of debate in 
parliament (Lovenduski 2005). The Women in Parliament inquiry (APPG 2014, 42) 
reported ‘several MPs avoid the Chamber during Prime Minister’s Questions due to 
the testosterone fuelled atmosphere’. In contrast, research on the reformed House 
of Lords found it ‘less-testosterone fuelled’, ‘less confrontational’ ‘a much gentler 
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place to work’ than the Commons, creating an atmosphere ‘in which women thrive’ 
(Eason 2010, 142). 
Both the UK and Australia have had female PMs, but few women have secured the 
other leadership positions in political parties which set up ministerial opportunities.  
In Australia it took until 2001 for a woman, Jenny Macklin, to be elected deputy 
leader of the ALP, followed by Julia Gillard in 2006-10. It was not until 2007 that the 
Liberal Party elected a female deputy, Julie Bishop. In the UK there have been two 
deputy leaders of the Labour Party: Margaret Beckett in 1992-94 and Harriet 
Harman 2007-15.  
Finally, there is evidence that women are excluded - either overtly or covertly - from 
the crucial networks around the PM that set up opportunities for ministerial office in 
generalist systems. The first female ALP minister, appointed in 1983, found that, as 
a woman, she was ‘not meant to be there’ (Ryan 1999a, 227); that her presence 
‘defied the natural order of things’ (1999a, 281); and that ‘men are meant to 
exercise power’ (Ryan 1999a, 284). In the UK women with ministerial experience 
stated the biggest barrier to ministerial appointment was ‘men’ (interview UK 1) and 
‘men’s sense of entitlement’ (UK 4), implying overt informal obstruction to women’s 
presence in executive office. Accounts of UK Labour governments 1997-2010 
described the culture of the inner circle around the leaders as ‘blokey’ and ‘laddish’, 
making it hard for women to access high-trust networks (Annesley and Gains 2010). 
However, interviews also reveal strategies used by networks of feminist actors to 
help women meet the informal qualification for ministerial office (interview UK 2; 
interview Australia 2). For example, PM Blair’s political secretary, Sally Morgan, 
would put women on his radar for ministerial appointment (interview UK 1; interview 
UK 3; interview UK 4) and female ministers now report being part of the high trust 
networks that preface ministerial appointments (interview Australia 2).  
 
Who Selects Ministers?  
The Australian constitution states the formal rule that the Governor-General as the 
Queen’s representative in Australia, ‘may appoint and dismiss the members of the 
Executive Council, ministers of state, and all officers of the executive government’ 
(Australian Constitutions 2.2.). However, the dominant practice in parliamentary 
democracies is that ministerial appointments are in the gift of the Prime Minister. In 
Westminster democracies this power of patronage is mostly unconstrained as 
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elections result in single party governments or, in the case of the Australian Liberal 
Party, a permanent and predictable alliance with a second party.  
Another important feature of Westminster systems is that the main party in 
opposition forms a shadow cabinet: ministerial careers are initially set up by being 
appointed to the cabinet in opposition (interview Australia 2; interview UK 4). One 
minister’s recruitment to cabinet was her reward for her having ‘put in a good 
campaign for us in opposition as a shadow minister’ (interview Australia 2). Ahead 
of the 2013 Australian election Liberal leader Abbott stated that ‘all my 
frontbenchers can expect to be doing the same job in government as they are now’ 
(cited in Annesley et al 2014). Abbott’s choice to enforce this informal rule meant 
that just one woman was appointed to cabinet as the other women on the shadow 
team lost her parliamentary seat (Annesley et al 2014).  
The informal rule of PM patronage in ministerial and shadow cabinet appointment 
most strongly applies to Conservative PMs in the UK and Liberal PMs in Australia. 
These significant informal powers of patronage reinforce loyalty as the core 
qualifying criteria. Strong PM autonomy in ministerial appointments equally means 
that a PM can, if the will is there, be proactive in appointing male and female 
ministers in equal numbers. PM David Cameron failed to deliver on his 2008 pledge 
of one-third women in his (coalition) cabinet 2010-15, partly due to his Coalition 
partner not nominating any female ministers, (Annesley and Gains 2010), but he 
met this target in his 2015 majority government.  
In contrast, Labour PMs in the UK and Australia have been more constrained in 
their powers of patronage due to formal rules which permit the party in parliament to 
select ministers through a ballot, a practice intended to secure a strong voice for the 
collective parliamentary party vis à vis executive leadership (McHenry 1955, 
Punnett 1964, Rhodes et al 2009). In the ALP the caucus elects ministers, with 
portfolios then allocated by the PM, a tradition that dates back to 1905 (Rhodes et 
al 2009, 105, Dowding and Lewis 2015, 47). In the UK, the Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) in opposition traditionally had the power to elect shadow ministers who 
subsequently become members of the cabinet after a successful general election. 
In the UK, the shadow cabinet was elected by the PLP annually until 2010. An 
incoming PM was not obliged to adopt the PLP list wholesale (Punnett 1964), but 
Kaufman (1997) advises that the political costs of ignoring it would be high, a 
sentiment echoed in an interview with a former minister (interview UK 4). When in 
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government Labour PMs have had the freedom to select their own ministers, albeit 
taking into account ‘the standing of politicians in the wider party and trade union 
movement’ (interview UK 4).  
This formal rule in labour parties changes the dynamics of ministerial recruitment. 
Rather than needing to demonstrate loyalty to the PM this practice dictates that it is 
essential for aspiring ministers to ‘lobby hard’ to secure strong support of the 
parliamentary party (Ryan 1999a, 211; interview UK 4). As has been documented 
elsewhere with respect to candidate selection for general elections, party 
selectorates can act as an additional barrier to women seeking to access political 
office (Kenny 2013). Indeed, the UK Labour Party, built on strong male working 
class and trade unionist traditions, traditionally prioritized class over gender (Lovecy 
2007) and the ALP caucus features an additional cleavage between the right 
‘influenced by Catholic social teaching’ and the left ‘influenced by traditional labour-
market protectionist beliefs’ (Kent 2009, 145).  
In his assessment of shadow cabinet elections 1955-63 Punnett (1964) found that 
there was little turnover on the lists, making it hard for newcomers, for example 
women, to secure a place the shadow ministerial list. Moreover, there were ‘a lot of 
blocs in the PLP, Scots voting for Scots and so on’ (interview UK 4). In Australia, 
ALP caucus elections have been flagged as one of the biggest hurdles to women in 
executive office (Ryan 1999) on account of the strong, gendered factions within the 
ALP (Summers 2003). The first female ALP minister, Susan Ryan stated that 
‘factional party power stymied more women than parliament’ (1999a, p. 138) and 
more recently the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Anna Burke, 
criticized faction leaders as ‘faceless men’ who were ‘firmly in control’ of the 
ministerial selection process, to the detriment of women who hoped for a 
‘meritorious selection’ (Crowe 2013, see also Dowding and Lewis 2015, 47).  
Even though the caucus vote and elected list was strictly enforced in Australia, 
informal rules have allowed ALP PMs to exercise discretion to improve diversity. In 
1990 Hawke sent the list back to the party faction and requested a ‘more balanced 
and representative selection’ (Weller 2007, 198). PMs Rudd and Gillard were 
permitted to by-pass the formal rule and make their own ministerial appointments as 
a ‘reward’ for returning the party to government (interview Australia 2). In 2007 
Rudd chose his ministers first and then got the seal of approval from the caucus, in 
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the process dumping ‘six time servers’ (Rhodes et al 2009, 105). Rudd was ‘very 
good at appointing women to key portfolios’ (interview Australia 2).  
In the UK a series of formal rule changes have secured the appointment of more 
women to shadow cabinets, a change which came about as a result of feminist 
campaigning within the party (interview UK 4). First, the size of the shadow cabinet 
was increased from 12 in 1979 to 15 in 1982, 18 in 1992 and 19 in 1995, to create 
more openings for women (interview UK 4). New voting rules for the 1992 shadow 
cabinet election specified that the top three women would be included in the 
shadow cabinet, even if they were not among the top 18 based on votes alone. In 
the years 1993-6 MPs were required to vote for four women with the sanction that 
ballot papers would be otherwise void.  
Following Labour’s return to opposition in 2010 shadow cabinet election required 
PLP members to vote for six women for the ballot to be valid to ensure the share of 
women in the shadow cabinet would be equal to their representation in the House 
of Commons (31.5 per cent). Following the report of a group commissioned to 
consider changing the rules the practice of shadow cabinet elections was abolished: 
Labour MPs were ‘sick of all those bloody emails from lobbying MPs’ and the 2010 
intake had ‘no strong memory of shadow elections’ (interview UK 4). In 2011 
shadow cabinet appointments reverted to an informal process of patronage by the 
party leader. This informal rule allowed Labour leader Ed Miliband 2010-15 (and 
Harriet Harman, interim leader for 2015) to achieve 50 per cent female 
representation in shadow cabinet, demonstrating that party leader or PM’s informal 
powers of patronage can deliver an improvement on what was achieved through 
formal quotas rules. According to one female former minister ‘Ed has done more 
than anyone else to break down male entitlement’ (interview UK 4).  
 
Conclusion: Informal Rules are doing the work in Ministerial Recruitment 
Australia and the UK are textbook Westminster parliamentary democracies with 
seemingly similar rules at the system level: ministers must be recruited from 
parliament, qualification for office is based on generalist criteria, and the PM should 
have discretion over ministerial appointments. A qualitative analysis of the rules in 
use of ministerial recruitment using original and existing data from both states 
reveal some commonalities but significant variation within the similar system: 
between the countries, between parties, and over time. These gendered rules and 
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how the actors within each complex of rules relate to them, strongly determine 
women’s access to ministerial office.  
In Australia and the UK there is an almost complete absence of written rules directly 
relating to ministerial recruitment, other than the clauses in the Australian 
constitution stating that ministers must be members of parliament, and that the 
Governor General formally appoints ministers. Analysis of the three institutional 
complexes does reveal some important associated formal rules which structure 
ministerial opportunities for women. However, there are significant differences 
between formal rules in each country, such as the rules of election versus selection 
to the upper houses of parliament. There are also important contrasts in the formal 
rules of the main parties in each state, most notably the gender quota rules adopted 
by the ALP and the formal rules which gave the parliamentary party or caucus a 
role in selecting their ministers. 
In the absence of (m)any explicit formal rules on ministerial recruitment, it is most 
evident that in both cases it is informal rules that are doing the work in structuring 
ministerial recruitment. Complementary informal rules are ‘filling the gaps’ and 
‘addressing the contingencies not dealt with in the formal rules’ (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004) in different ways, in different sites, and by different actors. These 
informal rules about ministerial recruitment operate alongside informal rules 
regarding gender which govern men and women’s assumed roles in the public and 
private spheres as well as expectation of appropriate modes of behavior for women 
in public life.  
Regarding the eligibility pool, the informal rule in use in both states is that ministers 
should predominantly be recruited from the lower house and this is particularly so in 
the UK because the Lords is non-elected. We also see competing informal rules at 
play in the ALP: formally, affirmative action in selection procedures was ‘on the 
books’ but not fully implemented because ‘when push came to shove, many of the 
boys were unwilling to extend the power base for preselection’ to women (Kirner 
cited in Kent 2009, 108).  
In the absence of any formal rules concerning how to qualify as a minister, 
complementary informal rules specify that generalist skills must be accumulated 
and demonstrated in parliament, parties and / or the PM’s networks. These 
unwritten rules of qualification can be described by insiders: ministers recall they 
became ministers as a reward for hard work and service to the party and / or loyalty 
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to the party leader. Equally, female insiders describe how women have traditionally 
been denied access to positions and networks which provide opportunities to 
accumulate generalist skills, initially because their ‘presence denied the natural 
order of things’ (Ryan 1999a, 277). Over time such informal rules of qualification 
have been challenged by female actors: women have created parallel informal 
networks for themselves (interview UK 1; interview Australia 2), or they have made 
use of strategically placed feminist allies to place women with the requisite 
generalist skills on the PM’s radar, as in the case of Sally Morgan, PM Blair’s 
political secretary.  
With regards ministerial selection, the dominant informal rule in use is that the PM 
has strong powers of patronage to choose his ministerial team. In Australia, 
substitutive informal rules allow the Australian PM rather than the Governor General 
to selects ministers and, in certain circumstances, a Labor PM rather than the 
caucus to make the ministerial selection. In the UK an informal rule has replaced 
the formal PLP rule, thus allowing the party leader to make the shadow cabinet 
appointments which set up ministerial opportunities. Informal rules underpinning PM 
patronage work both ways for aspirant female ministers. On the one hand they 
empower male and female PMs / leaders who are ‘sympathetic or feminist’ 
(interview UK 3) to appoint women to ministerial positions: Rudd and Miliband are 
described in interviews as feminist; Blair and Cameron as sympathetic. On the other 
hand, the informal rules allow PMs with no inclination to appoint women, to stick 
with the dominant norm of ministers as male (see Thatcher and Abbott).   
This institutionalist analysis of the rules of ministerial recruitment in Australia and 
the UK also identified some examples of institutional change which has improved 
women’s chances of being eligible for, qualifying for, or being selected to ministerial 
office. There is some evidence of change to informal rules, despite their reputation 
for being sticky, which has led to improvements in the recruitment of women to 
ministerial office. Labour leaders and PMs in both countries have invoked informal 
powers of patronage to challenge traditional party power structures in the caucus / 
PLP, which are strongly gendered to men’s advantage, and promote equality and 
diversity in ministerial appointments instead. Conservative PM Cameron also 
challenged his party’s traditional stance on gender, appointing one-third female 
ministers, in excess of their 20 per cent share of government seats in the 
Commons. That said, many informal rules remain, especially relating to the 
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generalist qualification criteria in parties and parliament, and these continue to 
disadvantage women.  
The evidence from this article is that some formal rules have replaced informal rules 
and that these, if properly enforced, have made a difference to women’s ministerial 
opportunities. For example, formal rule changes over the years have opened 
access for women to the House of Lords, thus allowing them to secure ministerial 
office by that route. Overt feminist activism within the ALP and UK Labour Party 
resulted in formal rules relating to candidate selection for the lower houses of 
parliament, thereby increasing the number of labour women in those eligibility 
pools. Rules regarding the election of the UK Labour Party shadow cabinet were 
formally changed in response to feminist campaigning within the PLP.  
From this premise it is possible to flag which further formal rules might improve 
women’s access to ministerial office. This article concludes with proposals for 
formal rules designed to boost women’s presence in the eligibility pool, improve 
their chances of qualifying in a generalist system, and steer the selectorate to 
appoint more women. To improve women’s presence in the eligibility pool, gender 
quotas in candidate selection should be adopted and enforced by all parties. Also, 
constitutional reform to create an elected, representative House of Lords would 
strengthen the legitimacy of that ministerial eligibility pool where women are 
‘thriving’ (Eason 2010). To address the informal, generalist rules of ministerial 
qualification, governments should introduce a formal job descriptions for ministers, 
coupled with a formal process of application (see Annesley 2014 and Murray 2014). 
To encourage selectorates to appoint male and female ministers in equal numbers, 
states should introduce gender quotas for executive office (Annesley 2014) as this 
would require PMs and/or the party selectorate in generalist systems to build more 
inclusive networks and spread rewards for loyalty and service more evenly between 
male and female party activists (Annesley 2014). 
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